From Abbild to Bild? Depiction and Resemblance in Husserl’s Phenomenology by Rozzoni, Claudio
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell'estetico 10 (1): 117-130, 2017
Firenze University Press 
www.fupress.com/aisthesisAisthesis
ISSN 2035-8466 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/Aisthesis-20912
Citation: C. Rozzoni (2017) From 
Abbild to Bild? Depiction and Resem-
blance in Husserl’s Phenomenology. 
Aisthesis 1(1): 117-130. doi: 10.13128/
Aisthesis-20912
Received: December 15, 2016
Accepted: April 15, 2017
Published: July 11, 2017
Copyright: © 2017 C. Rozzoni.This is 
an open access, peer-reviewed article 
published by Firenze University Press 
(http://www.fupress.com/aisthesis) and 
distribuited under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution License, 
which permits unrestricted use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in any medi-
um, provided the original author and 
source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All rel-
evant data are within the paper and its 
Supporting Information files.
Competing Interests: The authors 
have declared that no competing inter-
ests exist.
From Abbild to Bild? Depiction and 
Resemblance in Husserl’s Phenomenology
Claudio Rozzoni
(New University of Lisbon)
claudio.rozzoni@gmail.com
Abstract. In a well-known course he gave in 1904-1905, Edmund Husserl developed 
a ‘threefold’ notion of image revolving around the notion of depiction [Abbildung]. 
More specifically, the phenomenological description allows a seeing-in to emerge as an 
essential characteristic of the image consciousness, in which an image object assumes 
the role of a representant [Repräsentant] in order to allow us to see the image subject 
in the image itself (thanks to “moments of resemblance” shared by image object and 
image subject). Nevertheless, our paper – focusing particularly on what might be called 
the depictive art par excellence, that is the portrait – aims to show that it would be 
erroneous to read the Husserlian notion of image exclusively on the basis of this earlier 
course: things seem to change significantly when Husserl develops a different notion 
of phantasy, and artistic images, in particular, are not to be thought of as resembling 
something else, but rather as expressive images producing their own model.
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J’aime Michel. Mais j’aime encore mieux la vérité
D. Diderot
1. THE STRATIFIED STRUCTURE OF IMAGE CONSCIOUSNESS
In a well-known course he gave at Göttingen in the winter semes-
ter 1904-1905, entitled Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Theo-
rie der Erkenntnis, Edmund Husserl developed a ‘threefold’ notion of 
image. More specifically, the part of the course in which he deals with 
this specific issue is the third one (Phantasy and Image Conscious-
ness). According to his approach, when phenomenologically examining 
“physical images” (distinct from “phantasy images”, namely the ‘visual 
immaterial images’ one experiences in one’s own imagination), we 
can distinguish three moments, “three distinct, yet inseparable inten-
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tional objects” constituting them: the “image thing 
[Bildding]”, namely the image considered as a thing 
hanging on the wall; the “image object [Bildobjekt]”, 
that is the image we experience seeing in this thing 
on the wall and the “image subject [Bildsujet]”, i.e. 
what is represented by the image object (see Hus-
serl [1980]: 21). On the one hand, it is judicious to 
begin by recalling that this text is part of Husserli-
ana XXIII, Husserl’s collected manuscripts on Phan-
tasy, Image Consciousness and Memory, which were 
never published within Husserl’s lifetime. On the 
other hand, despite the often unsystematic charac-
ter of these writings, it is possible to trace several 
significant lines of thought through them – viable 
potential avenues of research from which Husserl 
drew important conclusions actually appearing in 
his published works (Ideas I and First Philosophy, for 
example) and which still represent a treasure trove 
of ideas for new reflections on image to draw upon.
Concerning the tripartition we have just men-
tioned, the texts in this volume (which span nearly 
twenty years) show how, on several occasions, Hus-
serl returned to re-examine this relationship among 
the three ‘objects’, which appears simple but is in 
truth highly complex. Thus, at minimum, we can 
say that such an account of physical images must 
not be seen as a fixed result of phenomenological 
investigations, but rather as a problematic nucleus 
that still stimulates important inquiries even today. 
In the last decade, significant works have been 
devoted to discussing this Husserlian account of 
image consciousness, more specifically with the goal 
of determining if and to what extent it can be ben-
eficial for understanding twentieth-century and con-
temporary images. Here, we will have the opportu-
nity to at least mention some of these contributions, 
and, more specifically, to try and gain some initial 
general insight on the role that resemblance plays in 
Husserl understanding of image, particularly in rela-
tion to the notion of depiction (Abbildung).
Thus, we can start by pointing out how, in the 
Göttingen analysis, the image object (the represent-
ant [Repräsentant]) can represent the subject on the 
grounds of “moments of resemblance” (see Hus-
serl [1980]: 33). The image object is representative 
of an image subject without merely being a sign of 
it, precisely because an image is not something that 
points beyond itself – as, Husserl remarks, a sign 
does –, but is rather internally referential (see Hus-
serl [1980]: 37). Images can function as, but are not, 
signs (see Husserl [1980]: 185; Marbach [2000]: 
295). Husserl strongly insists upon this point: we 
see the image subject in the image object through 
“these moments of resemblance”. What is implied 
in our experience of images is a “seeing-in” (see for 
example Husserl [1980]: 57)1. Now, at first glance, 
the threefold structure characterizing image con-
sciousness can easily be identified and described 
when, for example, we refer to a ‘normal’ pho-
tograph of someone – let us consider a very well-
known photograph of Husserl himself [Figure 1].
Viewing this photograph (and supposing 
it made of paper), we can decide to focus on: 1) 
the paper photograph as a “physical thing”; 2) 
the “miniature”, the “grayish-violet” face, namely 
the “photographic image” – the “depictive” image, 
something “not taken by us for even a moment as 
something real”; and 3) “the image subject” that 
“is depicted”, namely the father of phenomenol-
ogy: Edmund Husserl (Husserl [1980]: 20-21).
Regarding the relation between image object 
and image subject, as we anticipated, Husserl writes 
that they share “moments of resemblance”. And as 
regards resemblance, this ‘depictive bind’ seems, 
at this moment, to be constitutive of every image 
(including the ones we find in fine art). Accord-
ingly, one might say that in a depiction, by using 
the sensible content of the image thing, the image 
object must imitate the subject in order to allow 
us to see it in the image. And yet, the Husserlian 
notion of resemblance implies a peculiar sense that 
cannot be reduced to one of imitation. Nicolas de 
Warren, for example, stated that even though “Hus-
serl insists on resemblance as the irreducible core 
of visual representation […] resemblance is not 
taken to be a type of natural faithfulness, a causal 
1 As aptly recalled in Brough [2012]: 550:“the notion of 
‘seeing-in’, understood as an essential moment of repre-
sentation, has gained wide currency in Anglo-American 
aesthetics, particularly through Richard Wollheim’s Paint-
ing as an Art”. For a comparison between Husserl’s and 
Wollheim’s “seeing-in” see Brough [2012]: 550-553.
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interaction between copy and original. […] Instead, 
Husserl examines image-consciousness as a specific 
form of intentionality; yet, this placement of image-
consciousness in the framework of intentionality 
does not simply offer another name or novel guise 
for a traditional notion of resemblance as imita-
tion (mimesis), as an appearance that imitates the 
look of another appearance” (de Warren [2010]: 
306, my italics). This is tantamount to saying that 
the resemblance between an image and its subject 
is not, properly speaking, a resemblance between 
two things, namely an image and a person: “The 
original of which Husserl speaks does not enjoy a 
separate form of existence from its ‘being-pictured’ 
in an image” (de Warren [2010]: 316)2.
2 Also John Brough remarked (and this quotation clear-
ly echoes de Warren’s), that “the kind of resemblance at 
It has been notoriously remarked that the 
notion of resemblance is a slippery one, and the 
debate about its function in depiction is well-
known and plenty of facets (see for example 
Scholz [2004]: 17-81). Accordingly, we must pro-
ceed cautiously and try here to win some clar-
ity as far as the Husserlian approach (that, by 
the way, anticipated that debate) is concerned. 
Let us consider the image representing Husserl a 
bit further. In this case, according to the Göttin-
gen course, we have an image object that assumes 
the role of a representant [Repräsentant] for the 
image subject. The image object we see on the 
paper or the screen here is no higher than a span 
and of an unnatural color, one that we know could 
not be the color of Husserl’s skin or that of any-
one else. We know that, just as when we see old 
black-and-white photographs, we have no trouble 
understanding that the people and things depict-
ed in them do not actually lack color. And yet, 
despite this difference (which indeed turns out to 
be a necessary moment of image consciousness 
(see Husserl [1980]: §19)) the phenomenologi-
cal description allows a seeing-in to emerge as an 
essential characteristic of the image conscious-
ness. Of course, the image can also function as a 
‘catalyst for imagination’. Starting from this photo-
graph, we can imagine Husserl in flesh and blood, 
‘in full color’, absorbed in one of his famous phi-
losophische Spaziergänge with an assistant. But 
at that moment, we would have left the image in 
favor of engaging in a phantasy.
One can state that one sees Husserl (the image 
subject that is not present but presentified) in this 
image-object manifesting itself on the paper or 
on the screen. Nonetheless, even though seeing-
in always occurs in images, we can start to suggest 
that this form of seeing-in can entail a very different 
experience for the spectator, depending on the atti-
tude he or she assumes before images. In this par-
work in image consciousness […] differs from resem-
blance as it is commonly understood, which involves an 
external relation. The resemblance in imaging is instead 




ticular case, for example, we might say that our expe-
rience of the image implies an attitude toward real-
ity. Of course, this is not to suggest that we perceive 
something real: we do not take our experience of 
Husserl to be a real perception [Wahr-nehmung]. But 
we believe that this image truly represents the real 
Husserl who once was before the camera lens. We 
might add that, when we say that an image does not 
resemble the original, we already approach the image 
in a specific way, we are facing it in a specific atti-
tude. Above, in a deliberately naïve way, we dubbed 
this attitude “normal”. Now, we can certainly add that 
“normal” here does not mean ‘impartial’, ‘unbiased’. 
As we will see, there is no such a thing as an ‘inno-
cent’ – innocent in this very sense – image. We will 
come back to this. For now, what has been empha-
sized here is the fact that, in order for something to 
be an image of something else, the first need not be 
an imitation of the second. In this sense, images are 
not copies (see also Brough [2012]: 556). Nonethe-
less, that specified, we can still say that, at this stage 
of his reflections, Husserl describes the essence of 
image with a specific kind of relationship in mind 
between the image object and the subject we see in 
it. When seeing in a regime of image consciousness, 
he specifies, we do not intend, say, the little “grayish-
violet” object we are effectively seeing, but rather 
“another object, for which the appearing object func-
tions as a representant by means of its resemblance 
to it” (Husserl [1980]: 150). According to this ‘model’, 
as we have seen, the image object holds the function 
of “representant”. It does not have value in itself, but 
acts as a deputy [Stellvertreter] for something else 
intended in it, “another object like it or resembling 
it” (Husserl [1980]: 22).
From here, then, it is no surprise that Husserl 
can easily make recourse to the case of portraiture 
– which, at this point of his analysis, we might 
suggest is not so much as an example for him as a 
paradigm of how images essentially function: “The 
portrait is taken by us to be an image; that is, we 
do not mean the image object appearing chiefly 
in shades of grey or even a painting’s image object 
appearing in colors. We take the image object pre-
cisely as the image of such and such a person” 
(Husserl [1980]: 25).
2. THE ‘INDEPENDENT LIFE’ OF A PORTRAIT
We briefly defined the general traits that 
should help us outline the core of Husserl’s under-
standing of image in 1904-1905. We must now 
point out the fact that – as we might have expect-
ed – this seemingly simple subdivision regarding 
image structure may require further investigation. 
Here, in particular, we would like to try and pose 
some questions about the nature of the image sub-
ject. In order to do that, it could be useful to begin 
by questioning a paradigmatic example.
As we have already noted, the Husserlian tri-
partition we presented in reference to a ‘common’ 
photograph can be detected when referring to 
paintings. With respect to the famous portrait we 
now are going to discuss (see figure 2), we could, 
once again, distinguish the image thing (namely 
the “painted canvas” (see Husserl [1980]: 51)), 
the image object (that is, the “artificial presence” 
(see Wiesing [2005]) that, according to Husserl, 
appears to steal the sensory content from appre-
hension of the physical thing (see Husserl [1980]: 
48-51) and the image subject (that is to say Denis 
Diderot, le Philosophe).
The case to which I would now like to refer 
is quite a renowned one. It concerns a passage of 
Diderot’s famous Salons, the literary work com-
posed by comptes rendus of the biannual Paris-
ian exposition of the Académie Royale de Peinture 
et de Sculpture, which the philosophe drew up for 
Melchior Grimm’s Correspondance littéraire eve-
ry two years from 1759 to 1781 (with the excep-
tions of 1773, 1777 and 1779). Here, suffice it to 
say that Diderot’s task consisted of providing a 
literary description of the works shown in the 
Salon Carré at the Louvre, as Diderot’s work for 
Grimm’s Journal was basically meant to provide 
updates about the exhibit to a small number of 
royal houses outside France who were unable to 
see the masterpieces on display in Paris3. The spe-
cific passage I would like to examine is found in 
the Salon of 1767. Here, something very curious 
3 On the ekphrastic value of Diderot comptes rendus, see 
Mazzocut-Mis [2016].
121From Abbild to Bild? Depiction and Resemblance in Husserl’s Phenomenology
occurs to Diderot the moment he finds himself 
before a portrait of himself by Louis-Michel Van 
Loo [Figure 2]. Despite the wealth of “moments of 
resemblance” marking this portrait as one of well-
known philosophe, and despite the painting title 
(M. Diderot) unquestionably reflecting his own 
identity, the philosopher seems unable to recognize 
himself in this image. When describing Van Loo’s 
portrait in his compte rendu for the Correspon-
dance littéraire, he writes as follows:
Monsieur Diderot. Moi. J’aime Michel; mais j’aime 
encore mieux la vérité. Assez ressemblant. […] Très 
vivant. […] Mais trop jeune, tête trop petite. Joli 
comme une femme, lorgnant, souriant, mignard, fai-
sant le petit bec, la bouche en cœur. […] Mais que 
diront mes petits-enfants, lorsqu’ils viendront à com-
parer mes tristes ouvrages avec ce riant, mignon, effé-
miné, vieux coquet-là? Mes enfants, je vous préviens 
que ce n’est pas moi. J’avais en une journée cent phy-
sionomies diverses, selon la chose dont j’étais affecté. 
J’étais serein, triste, rêveur, tendre, violent, passionné, 
enthousiaste. Mais je ne fus jamais tel que vous me 
voyez là  (Diderot [1767]: 81-82, emphasis added).
Here, we clearly have a case of ‘failed recog-
nition’. It is not so much that the painter, Louis-
Michel Van Loo, fails to depict Denis Diderot. 
We all believe that this is Diderot and, from a cer-
tain point of view, this man on the canvas does 
resemble him (that is, no one would say it has no 
resemblance to Diderot – let us ignore the fact 
that is only thanks to other images to Diderot 
that we are able to consider this image resemblant 
of him! –, or, for example, that this image could 
possibly function as a depiction of Nietzsche). 
Nevertheless, another possible sense of the term 
“depiction” is evidently emerging here. Hence, 
we can draw the attention to the fact that in the 
Salons (and not only there, as we will see) we can 
witness a spectator’s experience (Diderot’s, and 
through him, our own) in which what we see is an 
image subject expressed and produced by images 
differing from the subject they are supposed or 
claim to depict. We might suggest that such cases 
highlight a difference – not pertaining to the dif-
ference between image object and image subject 
so much as to the discrepancy between a subject 
declared, patent, and a subject produced, latent. It 
Figure 2. Louis-Michel Van Loo, Portrait de Denis Diderot (1767)
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seems that in these instances one might refer to a 
creative or expressive depiction, a veritable resem-
blance with no original. In this sense, keeping in 
mind our earlier remarks about image conscious-
ness as seeing-in, we can say that the image object 
is always ‘condemned’ to produce a subject. From 
the moment where Husserl states that seeing-in 
pertains to the essence of image, he actually goes 
far beyond its own intentions.
As we have said, in the Salon, the subject we 
see in the image often (as in this case) eludes the 
painter’s own explicit intention. This is not to say 
that depiction necessarily fails in such instances; 
indeed, the painter may even achieve a ‘truthful’ 
depiction unintentionally. In his compte rendu, 
after having described Van Loo’s depiction of a 
‘stranger’ claiming to be himself – a stranger full 
of moments of resemblance to him, yet so unfaith-
ful to the original – Diderot gives us an example 
of a ‘reliable’ portrait of him. Now, the person 
who painted him in this appropriate way does not 
happen to be a great master; Diderot describes 
him as a “pauvre diable appelé Garant [sic]4, qui 
[l]’attrapa, comme il arrive à un sot qui dit un 
bon mot” (Diderot [1767]: 83). This more resem-
blant portrait, to refer to the 1904-1905 Husser-
lian account of physical images, seems to present 
far fewer moments of resemblance to the subject. 
Why? Diderot’s own answer is simply: “Celui qui 
voit mon portrait par Garant, me voit. Ecco il vero 
Polichinello” (Diderot [1767]: 83) [Figure 3].
3. ART AND PERZEPTIVE PHANTASIE
Even though, as we have seen, the resemblance 
involved in the Husserlian account of image con-
sciousness is a resemblance sui generis – an inten-
tional resemblance in which we see the subject in 
4 Jean-Baptiste Garand portrayed Diderot in September 
1760 at Mme d’Épinay’s dwelling at La Chevrette. Note 
what Diderot writes to Sophie Volland relating to this 
portrait: “Je suis représenté […] comme quelqu’un qui 
médite. Je médite en effet sur cette toile. ]’y vis, j’y respire, 
j’y suis animé; la pensée paroît à travers le front” (Diderot 
[1955-70]: III, 73).
the image – it must now be shown that the ‘mod-
el’ emerging from the Göttingen analysis is by no 
means definitive, a result to which we can reduce 
Husserl’s entire understanding of image. It would 
thus be incorrect to consider Husserl’s notion of 
image – and, for that matter, those of resemblance 
and depiction – on the sole basis of the 1904-1905 
course, for, as we have said, Husserl’s development 
of this analysis did not cease there5. A compre-
hensive account of his subsequent inquiries on the 
subject would obviously be outside the scope of 
this article, but it may be useful to attempt a gen-
eral outline of certain developments that impacted 
his notion of image in later years. We mentioned 
earlier that no image is ‘impartial’, in the sense 
of there being no specific attitude presupposed 
towards it. We must now refer to the aesthetic atti-
tude one can take when experiencing images, an 
attitude that, probably more than any other, can 
put the above-outlined essential structure of image 
consciousness to the test. It is important to pref-
ace this by remarking that distinguishing between 
one kind of attitude and another, as we are about 
to do, may appear too normative at times; indeed, 
different attitudes can often mingle. We will come 
back to this.
For now, we could start by saying that, for 
Husserl, when living in an aesthetic attitude, we 
are not interested in the existence of what we see 
before our eyes. Nor are we interested in the pos-
sible existence of a presentified subject we see in 
an image. Indeed, with the images of Husserl and 
Diderot discussed in the preceding sections, we 
may note similarities between them as regards the 
attitude we adopt towards them. On the one hand, 
we can affirm that we see, respectively, Edmund 
Husserl and Denis Diderot (with the paradigmat-
ic case of Diderot’s own denial) in the images. On 
the other hand, of course, “seeing” someone in an 
image is not the same as seeing someone “in per-
5 “In the years following these lectures, Husserl substan-
tially refined the analysis of the various specific forms of 
acts of intuitively representifying something (anschauli-
ches Vergegenwärtigen), acts of imagining, depicting, and 
remembering in particular” (Marbach [2013]: 433-434).
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son”, having them before us in “flesh and blood”. 
Hence, these images do not constitute presenta-
tions (Gegenwärtigungen) of Edmund Husserl and 
Denis Diderot (they are not there, actually pre-
sent), but merely presentifications (Vergegenwärti-
gungen) of them (they are presentified). And yet, 
we might affirm that, in both experiences (keep-
ing in mind, of course, the many other differences 
between them) our attitude toward reality is that of 
believing in the real existence of the men the depic-
tions purportedly represent. To borrow the famous 
expression of Roland Barthes (who instead, in this 
respect, would clearly keep separate the two kinds 
of image): we do believe that Edmund Husserl and 
Denis Diderot, respectively, “have been there”. We 
certainly are in a regime of image consciousness 
and not of reality consciousness (we know very 
well that Husserl and Diderot in the image are not 
really there on the paper or on the screen), yet 
our act of seeing-in into these images is, broadly 
speaking, intertwined with a “ray” of belief mark-
ing the subject we see in the image (we know that 
Husserl and Diderot are not here, but we believe 
they were there in “flesh and blood” when their 
portraits were created in either painted or photo-
graphic form). While viewing these kinds of pho-
tographs or paintings, our experience is stamped 
by a form of belief in the existence of what we see 
in the image – we have a specific attitude before 
it. In phenomenological terms, we could propose 
designating them as positing images, insofar as they 
posit something as existent (not the image object 
appearing on the canvas or paper, of course, but 
rather the image subject they claim to represent).
But what about images that do not involve 
any form of interest as regards what they repre-
Figure 3. Pierre Chenu, engraving from Jean-Baptiste Garand, Portrait de Diderot (around 1760)
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sent? How do we approach the issue of subject 
depiction in those instances, and what role do 
resemblance and imitation play in such depic-
tions? Indeed, this would appear also to involve 
what Husserl calls aesthetic consciousness, a sepa-
rate type of image consciousness from that which 
characterizes ‘common’ physical images concerned 
with questions of ‘existence’. Essential differences 
are to be found, for instance, between the con-
sciousness involved in viewing in a simple photo-
graph as denoting someone and the one involved 
in seeing the same image “aesthetically”. In the 
latter, properly speaking, whether what I see in 
the image exists is not important: what truly mat-
ters is how what I see in it shows itself to me. In 
order to shed light on these delicate questions, it 
can be beneficial to refer, albeit in a very general 
way, to some noteworthy steps that, under specif-
ic aspects, represent a significant change in Hus-
serl’s consideration of image as compared to the 
1904-1905 course we summarized above. First of 
all, let us recall the famous letter Husserl wrote 
to Hugo von Hofmannsthal in January 1907, in 
which Husserl points out several essential com-
monalities between the figure of the phenom-
enologist and that of the artist, thereby opening 
up possibilities for consideration of the role epo-
ché might play in the aesthetic field. In particu-
lar, phenomenologists and artists share a peculiar 
“attitude towards all forms of objectivity” (Hus-
serl [1907]: 2). Artists, Husserl says, suspend “all 
attitudes relating to emotions and the will which 
presuppose […] an existential attitude” (Husserl 
[1907]: 2) – a remark that, we might certainly 
add, applies to the audience as well. In order for 
us, as the audience, to contemplate a work of art 
in terms of a “purely aesthetic”(Husserl [1907]: 2) 
experience, no existence of the object observed is 
to be implied. Of course, this applies not only to 
‘the’ image appearing exclusively, say, on a canvas 
– which is an image object, a “nothing” – but also 
to the subject we can see in the images on a can-
vas: the existence of what is seen in the image (for 
instance, in what we have called positing images, 
images with belief) is, from this perspective, out of 
play. This does not mean that art cannot involve 
references to reality; indeed, many such references 
may be present on numerous levels. However, in 
order for us to judge from a purely aesthetic per-
spective, we should suspend all attitudes toward 
this reality. Philosopher (read: phenomenologist) 
and artist (and audience member) see what they 
see as a pure appearance (Erscheinung) (see Hus-
serl [1907]: 2). They do not refute the existence of 
what they are seeing: that would be a negation of 
their existence implying a form of position tak-
ing (namely, against their existence). They do not 
even begin to take it as real. Although we cannot 
linger too long on this complicated question here, 
it must be noted that the reference to disinterest-
edness in existence as a defining characteristic of 
our aesthetic experience is clearly reminiscent of 
Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment – a debt 
that, after all, Husserl himself explicitly acknowl-
edges (see Husserl [1907]: 2).
Secondly, after having inaugurated his analysis 
on time precisely in the fourth part of the Göt-
tingen course, by 1909 Husserl had considerably 
revised his “content-apprehension schema”6 and 
abandoned his “theory of representation (Theo-
rie der Repräsentation)”7. Though space con-
straints prevent us from providing a meticulous 
account of the complexities of this development 
here, let us remark that these changes represent 
significant steps that ultimately led him to recon-
sider his notion of phantasy-image and of phan-
tasy tout court. Essentially, the problematic issue 
in 1904-1905 is that Husserl’s initial inquiry into 
the essence of images relies upon representation 
[Repräsentation] as a model to explain both physi-
cal images (those manifesting themselves on a 
material support, such as photographs and paint-
ings) and phantasy images (those generated purely 
through phantasy, which, as he says, merely “hov-
er before us” (Husserl [1980]: 17)). Even when 
dealing with phantasy images, he attempts to char-
acterize presentifications by calling into question 
6 See in particular “Text no. 8 (probably from Autumn 
1909)” in Husserl [1980]: 323-327.
7 See Husserl [1980]: 244, note 3: “The false theory of rep-
resentation misled me”.
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the function of a representant that is designed to 
resemble (in the sense already outlined) a subject 
we are supposed to see in it. According to this ini-
tial approach, presentifications through physical 
and phantasy images can, in principle, be expe-
rienced by the same “I” that experiences percep-
tions under other circumstances – that is, the “I” 
who intuits a tree through perception, or who 
intuits a tree upon seeing it in a physical image 
(based on its resemblance to an actual tree) or 
phantasizing it in a phantasy image (again, based 
upon specific moments of resemblance), are one 
and the same.
Nevertheless, by the end of the third part of 
the course, Husserl is already growing hesitant to 
continue along this path, and soon he shifts the 
direction of his analysis (see Husserl [1980]: §38 
ff.). Whereas before he had endeavored to find 
the common structure of physical and phantasy 
images based on the model of the depictive rela-
tionship recognized in physical images, he now 
begins to conceive of the essence of phantasy 
‘images’ differently, and simultaneously to recog-
nize that phantasy can assume a central role in 
image-consciousness8. What is important to stress 
here is that, thanks to developments in this direc-
tion furthered in later years – complementarily to 
Husserl’s inquiries on time – the phenomenon of 
presentification reveals a peculiar structure that 
can be essentially differentiated from that of the 
image consciousness as it is still presented in the 
1904-1905 analysis. Putting it in the simplest way: 
through his analysis, Husserl comes to the con-
clusion that, when we phantasy something, we 
do not merely have a phantasized image that pur-
portedly functions as a representant of the thing 
phantasized (in the same way as an image object). 
Rather, we are involved in a veritable reproduction 
8 “Although one speaks in a respectable sense of imaging 
in phantasy, and although, on the other side, phantasy 
makes up the most essential moment even in common 
imaging, as we have just discovered, it nevertheless seems 
most appropriate to speak of ‘imaging,’ of ‘image appre-
hension,’ only in cases in which an image, which for its 
part first functions as a representing object for something 
depicted, actually appears” (Husserl [1980]: 87).
of an experience in which we find not only ‘what 
is phantasized’, but also the implied reproduction 
of a phantasized “I” who phantasizes that con-
tent, quasi-living the judgments, the feelings, the 
desires brought about by this quasi-reality (see 
also Husserl [1980]: 713). A ‘phantasy-I’ must 
then be a transcendental correlate of a phantasized 
object that I – as a Phantasie-Ich – experience in 
the as-if mode without the mediation of an image. 
Phantasies are reproductions without being mere 
copies: they are reproductions involving a phan-
tasized ‘I’ of experiences that never occurred9. We 
might well suggest that they are re-productions of 
possible experiences (see Franzini [2001]: 29). In a 
1912 text, in keeping with the change of direction 
mentioned above, Husserl goes as far as to affirm 
that this very structure of phantasy also calls for 
a more developed conception of image conscious-
ness: “we must […] universalize”, he writes, “the 
concept of phantasy (let us say, the concept of pre-
sentification)” (Husserl [1980]: 565, transl. slightly 
modified), which then allows us to conceive of 
“two fundamental forms of presentification:
1) reproductive presentification [we might also 
describe this as ‘immaterial presentification’]
2) presentification complying with perceptio 
[perzeptive]10, presentification in image” [Husserl 
[1980]: 565, transl. slightly modified].
According to this, both ‘phantasy image’ – that 
is, reproductive image – and ‘image complying 
with perceptio’ “are cases of imagination [Imagina-
tion]” (Husserl [1980]: 570). In this regard, Hus-
serl goes as far as to state that “this must never 
be forgotten and is absolutely certain” (Husserl 
[1980]: 570). We can then notice the following: 
In 1904-1905, Husserl developed an ultimately 
unsuccessful parallel between image consciousness 
and phantasy consciousness on the basis of the 
notion of imagination [Imagination] understood as 
“conversion into image [Verbildlichung]”; here, he 
9 On the creative character of the reproductive structure 
of phantasy, see for example Bernet [2004]: 94; 111-112.
10 I discussed this terminological distinction between per-
ceptio [Perzeption]/complying with perceptio [perzeptiv] 
and perception [Wahrnehmung] in Rozzoni [2016].
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establishes that same parallel on the basis of imag-
ination [Imagination], but this time understood 
as “quasi-actual experience [quasi Erfahrung]”, 
namely “phantasy” (Husserl [1980]: 569). Image 
consciousness can then be conceived of as presen-
tification complying with perceptio or, as Husserl 
also writes in a relevant manuscript we will now 
conclude with, perzeptive Phantasie.
4. FROM ABBILD TO BILD
In a manuscript that, according to Eduard 
Marbach, probably dates back to 1918, Hus-
serl ultimately brings up this notion of perzep-
tive Phantasie directly in context of characterizing 
art as “the realm of phantasy that has been given 
form” (Husserl [1980]: 616). In this manuscript, 
Husserl strongly exemplifies the idea of a phan-
tasy complying with a pure positionless perceptio 
through an inquiry concerning the ‘perception’ of 
the actor’s body. Here, the notion of perceptio [Per-
zeption] and that of phantasy give rise to the cru-
cial and complicated notion of perzeptive Phanta-
sie, echoing the one of presentification complying 
with perceptio (and of imagination [Imagination] 
complying with perceptio, at least in the sense we 
have just specified). Although the ‘experimen-
tal’ nature of these manuscripts encourages us to 
exercise caution in evaluating the precise scope of 
their implications, this text11, at the very least, can 
be described as offering relevant hints as to how 
Husserl’s profound and ceaseless work on phanta-
sy finally allows him (and us) to rethink the very 
notions of depiction and resemblance we discussed 
at the beginning of this article. Husserl declares 
that he previously erroneously “believed that […] 
belong[s] to the essence of fine art to present in 
an image” and “understood this presenting to be 
depicting” (Husserl [1980]: 616). The case of theat-
er seems to be paradigmatic in this regard: “In the 
case of a theatrical performance”, he affirms, “we 
live in a world of perzeptive Phantasie; we <have> 
‘images’ (Bilder) within the cohesive unity of one 
11 I developed some of the many implications of this text 
in relation to filmic image in Rozzoni [2016].
image, but we do not for that reason have depic-
tions (Abbilder)” (Husserl [1980]: 616). Indeed, 
we experience such images in a consciousness of 
“neutrality”(Husserl [1980]: 617), better: In the 
consciousness of the “as-if ”(Husserl [1980]: 617), 
in a phantasy that displays itself in accordance 
with perceptio. We can say that images are produc-
tive ficta permeated with the character of unreality. 
And yet, we are not dealing with an “illusion”, at 
least “in the ordinary sense” (Husserl [1980]: 617) 
(unlike the well-known wax mannequin examples 
Husserl often drew upon12). Interestingly, Hus-
serl specifies that “the actors produce an image, 
the image of a tragic event, each actor producing 
the image of a character in the play, and so on. But 
here ‘image of ’ [Bild von] does not signify depic-
tion of [Abbild von]” (Husserl [1980]: 617). And 
yet, even without aiming to circumscribe the exact 
range of this important statement here, we can at 
least suggest that this passage ‘from Abbild to Bild’ 
does not concern theater exclusively, but other 
arts as well; indeed, it may even concern what we 
might call the depictive art par excellence, namely 
the portrait. Note that Husserl is not suggesting 
that the depictive function inevitably disappears 
where the theater is concerned. As we already 
noted in the first two sections, it is important to 
clarify our attitude toward images, the type of 
consciousness they call for. Thus, when watching 
“Wallenstein or Richard III […] depictive pres-
entations are surely involved, although the extent 
to which this depictiveness has an aesthetic func-
tion itself is a question we will have to consider” 
(Husserl [1980]: 616). “Certainly”, Husserl writes, 
“depictiveness is not the primary concern; rather, 
it is a matter of imaging in the sense of phantasy 
12 “We must note, however, the importance of the obvious 
distinction between: 1) The group of cases exemplified 
by the example of the mannequin/human being. Here we 
have unmodified apprehension tendencies, belief tenden-
cies fighting with belief tendencies. 2) The image appre-
hensions, specifically the ordinary aesthetic image appre-
hensions (not the wax-figure apprehensions and similar 
‘disappointments’)” (Husserl [1980]: 570). On the differ-
ence between the character of images and that of illu-
sions, see also Desideri 2008: 161-164.
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complying with perceptio understood as immediate 
imagination” (Husserl [1980]: 616, transl. slightly 
modified). The very same situation can arise with 
portraits. We can think of the model of the Abbil-
dung as related to the attitude regarding the deno-
tative depiction we outlined above. This is what 
Husserl means when he ascertains that “an actual 
depicting presents itself in the case of a portrait, 
which, moreover, can just as well be the portrait 
of an imaginary person as of an actual person” 
(Husserl [1980]: 617). And yet with portraits, too, 
“depictiveness […] may itself fall into the aesthetic 
consciousness as such” (Husserl [1980]: 617, transl. 
slighty modified) – more specifically, I would add, 
into an aesthetic consciousness complying with the 
regime of perzeptive Phantasie.
This seems to be exactly the case in the para-
doxical instance of failed recognition experienced 
by Diderot: the image object appearing on the 
canvas enjoyed a form of “semblance” with itself, 
not relying on a denotative “depiction” (on this 
point see also Spinicci [2008]: 23-31). Rather, the 
philosophe experienced a form of presentification 
complying with perceptio of a stranger before him. 
Instead of confronting a depiction of a subject 
preceding the act of depiction, he encounters the 
subject produced – or we should say: expressed 
– in the phantasized experience given in accord-
ance with perceptio. From this perspective, we can 
affirm that art – even the art of portraiture, as in 
this peculiar case – opens up to many levels of rec-
ognition, comprising a sort of creative recognition, 
and may present more or less of these levels in 
each case, intertwined in different ways.
Whereas the concept of “moments of resem-
blance” might strongly imply a denotative attitude 
under Husserl’s 1904-1905 perspective, under the 
perspective of presentification complying with 
perceptio, such moments might now be under-
stood as expressive as well (as, after all, a Husserl’s 
manuscript from 1906 already suggests13). At the 
13 “Instant photography: Among the innumerable par-
ticular positions that actually occur, which is the one 
‘noticed’? And among those that are noticed, which is the 
‘best’? Every nerve, every muscle, attuned to the action. 
very least, it might be suggested that Van Loo’s 
portrait of Diderot expressed a subject that (if we 
take Diderot’s word) never existed nor was imag-
ined. More significantly, the last century com-
pelled us to recognize new kinds of resemblances, 
in which “immanent subjects” emerge from the 
canvas rather than predating it in their existence. 
We can easily call to mind several examples of 
portraits in which the portrait artist’s subject is 
unrecognizable on the canvas (even for the sub-
ject himself or herself ). In such cases, despite 
the absence of a denotative depiction, we still can 
recognize a ‘peculiar’ subject (whose nature now 
warrants further investigation), and might then 
be able to recognize that subject in reality despite 
never having seen him or her before14. Even in 
cases where the portrait’s title assures us that the 
face on the canvas is one belonging to a real per-
son, this reference often becomes wholly unes-
sential. What Proust wrote in the Recherche about 
the great painter Elstir (who, parenthetically, is in 
fact a product of Proust’s imagination) is true of 
many other 20th-century painters as well: when 
viewing portraits they have produced, we struggle 
to recognize the subject they purportedly presen-
tify. We sometimes even find it hard to phantasize 
them in a reproductive way. Nevertheless, in such 
instances in particular, we can experience a kind 
of recognition while seeing-in the image: indeed, 
“il y a là un être que nous sentons bien que nous 
avons déjà vu”, a person who recall to us not 
this particular woman but other women, that is, 
in Elstir’s case, “toutes celles qu’a peintes Elstir” 
(Proust [1919]: 425). Correspondingly, we can 
think along similar lines when considering recog-
nition of a woman in, say, a Picasso, a Kirchner, 
an Otto Dix (and, again, different women emerg-
Nothing indifferent, nothing random. Etc. As much 
expression as possible” (Husserl [1980]: 169, my italics).
14 “Des femmes passent dans la rue, différentes de celles 
d’autrefois, puisque ce sont des Renoir, ces Renoir où 
nous nous refusions jadis à voir des femmes. […] Tel 
est l’univers nouveau et périssable qui vient d’être créé. Il 
durera jusqu’à la prochaine catastrophe géologique que 
déchaîneront un nouveau peintre ou un nouvel écrivain 
originaux” (Proust [1920-21]: 317).
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ing from the world – complying with perceptio – 
of each artist) [Figures 4, 5, 6].
One last suggestion we must mention, albeit 
briefly, before concluding regards the paradoxi-
cal fact that resemblance can often be obtained 
through this perzeptive Phantasie via deforma-
tion, especially in works created in the early part 
of the 20th century (see Costa [2010]: 135). Suffice 
it to note here that it could be profitable to trace 
this idea back – or at least connect it – to Husserl’s 
famous statement in Ideas I about the importance 
of imagination as a means of discovering essence 
through variation, a concept elaborated signifi-
cantly in Merleau-Ponty’s work on the relation 
between painting and essence. To express it in a 
very general way, we could say that (for example 
in Merleau-Ponty) deformation of reality through 
painting becomes an essential means of enabling 
the expression and recognition of ideas. In Mer-
leau-Ponty’s words: “painting does not imitate the 
world but is a world of its own. This means that, in 
our encounter with a painting, at no stage are we 
sent back to the natural object; similarly, when we 
experience a portrait aesthetically, its ‘resemblance’ 
to the model is of no importance (those who com-
mission portraits often want them to be good like-
nesses, but this is because their vanity is greater 
than their love of painting). […] Suffice it to say 
that even when painters are working with real 
objects, their aim is never to evoke the object itself, 
but to create on the canvas a spectacle which is 
sufficient unto itself ” (Merleau-Ponty [1948]: 96).
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